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INTRODUCTION TO WATER USE LAW IN
NORTH CAROLINA
WILLIAM B. AycocK*
[I] t is not amiss to say that a State which deals with its resources
on the principle attributed to Louis XIV---'aprs noi le deluge'-
is headed for economic ruin. Seawell, J. (Hampton v. North
Carolina Pulp Co., 223 N.C. 535, 550 (1943)).
When a drop of rain (or snow, or sleet, or hail) falls on the
surface of North Carolina, it begins a journey to the Atlantic Ocean,
or to the Gulf of Mexico, if it does not return to the atmosphere
by evaporation or transpiration or become imprisoned underground.
The journey may involve a variety of routes and some delays. The
raindrop may travel in a watercourse, or on the surface, or it may
* Kenan Professor of Law, University of North Carolina. My Research
Assistant, W. P. Aycock II, is acknowledged for the many contributions he
made in the preparation of this article.
The literature on the subject is extensive. Some of the important sources
are: H. Ellis, Some Legal Aspects of Water Use in North Carolina, THE
LAW OF WATER ALLOCATION IN THE EASTERN UNITED STATES, 189-370(1958); NORTH CAROLINA BD. OF WATER CoMM'R REP. (1956); NORTH
CAROLINA BD. OF WATER CoMM'Rs, SECOND REP. (1958); NORTH CAROLINA
DEP'T oF WATER RESOURCES, FIRST BIENNIAL REP". (1960); NORTH CARo-
LINA DEP'T OF WATER RESOURCES, SECOND BIENNIAL REP. (1962); NORTH
CAROLINA DEP'T OF WATER RESOURCES, NORTH CAROLINA WATER RESOURCE
PLANNING (1964); 1-2 NORTH CAROLINA DEP'T OF WATER RESOURCES,
WISE MANAGEMENT OF NORTH CAROLINA WATER RESOURCES THROUGH
LAW (1966) [hereinafter cited as 1-2 WISE MANAGEMENT]; NORTH CARO-
LINA DEP'T OF WATER RESOURCES, WISE MANAGEMENT OF NORTH CAROLINA
WATER RESOURCES THROUGH LAw-FINAL REP. (1967) [hereinafter cited
as WISE MANAGEMENT-FINAL REPORT]*; R. DEWIEST, A. SAYR, & C.
JACOB, EVALUATION OF POTENTIAL IMPACT OF PHOSPHATE MINING ON
GROUND-WATER RESOURCES OF EASTERN NORTH CAROLINA (1957) [herein-
after cited as DEWIEST] (for an extensive bibliography see pages 164-67
of this report); P. GREEN, D. HAYMrAN, & E. MACHEN, STREAt POLLUTION
IN NORTH CAROLINA (1951); Ligon, Legal Basis for Water Pollution Con-
trol, 28 POPULAR GOv'T 6 (April 1962); Heath, Some Legal Aspects of
Federal and State Regulation of Water Pollution, 30 POPULAR GOv'T 9(June 1964); Heath, The Legal Implications of Water-Quality Standards,
33 POPULAR GOV'T 9 (Oct. 1966); INSTITUTE OF Gov'T, UNC WATER RE-
SOURE PAPERS (1963-1966); Marquis, Freeman & Heath, The Movementfor New Water Rights Law in the Tennessee Valley States, 23 TENN. L. Rnv.
806 (1955); Well, Theories of Water Law, 27 HARV. L. REV. 530 (1914);
Weil, Waters: The American Law and French Authority, 33 HARV. L. REV.
133 (1919); H. FARNHAM, THE LAW OF WATER AND WATER RIGHTS
(1904); R. CLARK, WATER AND WATER RIGHTS (1967); R. PowEtL.L, THE
LAw OF REAL PROPERTY (1962); VI-A AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY (A. J.
Casner ed. 1954).
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go underground and move along through cracks and crevices. Scien-
tifically, the movement of the raindrop-irrespective of the itinerary
it follows-is involved in a single process-the hydrologic cycle.1
The common law takes a different view. A raindrop is classified
according to where it happens to be at a given point in its travels.
These classifications2 are: (1) watercourses, (2) diffused surface
water, (3) subterranean or underground water. In England dif-
ferent legal rules developed for each of these classifications. These
rules provided the basis for the common law of water use in North
Carolina. The courts have substantially altered the English law
in each classification. Thus, today, the common law of North
Carolina is more a departure from, rather than an adherence to,
the common law of England.
Water laws designed to deal with the relationships of private
persons in the use and disposition of water while it is on or adjacent
to their land are largely a product of the judiciary. These laws serve
an important function, but they were not designed to protect the
larger public interest in water resources in these times. Conse-
quently, a new body of law, largely statutory, is being developed
with the objective of protecting the public interest. This new
development in North Carolina is in response to recent warnings
that all is not well on the waterfront.
The average annual precipitation over North Carolina is approxi-
mately forty-eight inches.' Sometimes too much falls at a given
'The hydrologic cycle is defined as follows:
In the natural sequence of events, water evaporated from the ocean by
the energy of the sun is carried inland as vapor and some falls on the
land as rain, snow, sleet, or hail. Some of the precipitation is returned
to the atmosphere by evaporation and transpiration, and the remainder
percolates into the soil or flows overland and down the channels of
surface streams. Much of the water that enters the soil is evaporated
or transpired, but the remainder moves downward to the water table
and enters the zone of saturation. Some of this water goes into per-
manent ground-water storage, but much of it moves laterally toward
streams, maintaining the fair-weather flow. The water that moves be-
neath or upon the land surface eventually reaches the sea where it is
again evaporated. This phenomenon is known as the hydrologic cycle.
2 WISE MANAGEMENT app. F at Fl.
2 On legal classification of water see generally 1 R. CLARK, WATERS AND
WATER RIGHTS § 50, at 283 (1967).
*2 WIsE MANAGEMENT app. F at Fl, F2. It is estimated that in the
coastal plain and piedmont provinces, which comprise about 95 percent of
the state, about two-thirds of the precipitation is returned to the atmosphere
by evaporation and by transpiration of plants, about one-sixth is direct run-
off into the streams, and the remainder sinks into the pores and other open-
ings in the soil and underlying rocks and becomes subterranean water.
DEWIEST 35.
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place, and at other times there is too little. The critical fact is that
overall the supply is relatively static while the need for water is in-
creasing at a rapid rate."
The General Assembly has undertaken to deal with this changing
situation by enacting two types of statutes. The first category may
be called water development laws. These laws usually involve groups
and communities. Typically, these laws provide for soil and water
conservation districts, flood plain management, drainage districts,
authority for cities and counties to provide water and sewage ser-
vices, and authority for participation in federal water supply proj-
ects.' Second, there are statutes designed to control water use. In
1967 the General Assembly declared that the water resources of the
state "belong to the people" 6 and pursuant to this policy declaration
enacted several laws, including a Water Use Act.
7
This article is concerned with water use laws as distinguished
from water development laws. It will deal both with the laws de-
fining the rights of landowners in water resources and with the laws
on water use designed to protect the public interest.
PART I-PRIvATE RIGHTS
Watercourses
1. Riparian Rights in General.
The Water Use Act of 1967 expressly provides that the Act does
not change or modify existing common or statutory law "with
respect to the relative rights of riparian owners concerning the use
'E.g., Estimates of water for 1975 indicate that 1,754 million gallons
per day will be withdrawn for domestic, agricultural, and industrial use of
which 743 million gallons will be used consumptively. By comparison, in
1956 the state was using about 914 million gallons per day of which 430 mil-
lion gallons were used consumptively. NORTH CAROLINA BD. OF WATER
CoMM'Rs, SECOND REPORT 15-16 (1958).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 139 (1964), as anended, ch. 987 (1967) N.C. Sess.
L. (Soil and Water Conservation Districts and Flood Plain Management);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 156 (1964) (Drainage Districts); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 160-239 to -257 (1964) (authorization for cities to provide water and
sewerage services); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 153-284 to -294 (1964) (authoriza-
tion for counties to provide water and sewerage services); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 143 art. 21 (1964) and ch. 308 (1959) N.C. Sess. L. (providing authority
for participation in federal water supply projects) ; Heath, Small Watershed
Enabling Laws, 26 POPULAR GOV'T 2 (Nov. 1959); Heath, Small Watershed
Prograins, 26 POPULAR GOV'T (March-April 1960); Wicker, Water Re-
sources, 30 PopuLAR GOV'T 69 (Sept.-Oct. 1963); Heath & Wicker, Water
Resources, 32 POPULAR GOV'T 71 (Sept. 1965).
' The North Carolina Water and Air Resources Act, Ch. 892 [1967]
N.C. Sess. L., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-211 (1967).
Water Use Act of 1967, Ch. 933 [1967] N.C. Sess. L.
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of surface waters."'  Since riparian' rights do not apply to diffused
surface water and only in rare instances to underground water,'"
the term "surface" water in this particular provision of the Act
must mean surface water in watercourses. We may, then, proceed
to inquire; what is the existing common and statutory law in North
Carolina with respect to the relative rights of riparian owners in
watercourses? In general, the law of riparian rights applies only
to waters in a natural watercourse as distinguished from an artificial
one.
A watercourse consists of bed, banks and water. . . . A natural
watercourse has such characteristics while in a state of nature
and without artificial construction. Natural watercourses are
such as rivers, creeks and branches. A canal can never come
under such a designation, unless it is a mere enlargement of a
natural watercourse."
A riparian proprietor is an owner of land in actual contact with
a natural watercourse." Close proximity is not sufficient. A mu-
nicipality may be a riparian owner but inhabitants of the city who
purchase water from the municipality do not have riparian rights.' 8
One not a riparian owner, however, may acquire riparian rights by
prescription."4
The necessity for alleging and proving that a person is vested
with riparian rights was illustrated vividly in a recent case. The
plaintiff, a lessee, irrigated his crop of vegetables from a stream.
Because the stream was polluted, the Department of Agriculture
prohibited him from marketing his crop. The plaintiff sued the
polluter and a jury awarded him a verdict of forty-five hundred dol-
8 Id., § 12.
"'Riparian' is from the Latin word 'riparius,' of or belonging to the
bank of a river; in turn derived from 'ripa,' a bank, and is defined as
'pertaining to or situated on the bank of a river;' the word has refer-
ence to the bank, and not to the bed of the stream. The words 'ripa-
rian property' have, however, been frequently applied also to owner-
ship on the shores of the sea or of a lake, a condition more accurately
expressed by the phrase 'littoral proprietor.'
56 Am. JuR. Waters § 273 (1947).
See "Underground Water" p. 22 infra.
"Porter v. Armstrong, 129 N.C. 101, 106, 39 S.E. 799, 801 (1901); Darr
v. Carolina Aluminum Co., 215 N.C. 768, 3 S.E.2d 434 (1939) (ditch is
an artificial stream).
"- Miller v. Coppage, 261 N.C. 430, 135 S.E.2d 1 (1964); Young v. City
of Asheville, 241 N.C. 618, 86 S.E.2d 408 (1955).
1 Pernell v. City of Henderson, 220 N.C. 79, 16 S.E.2d 449 (1941).
,See "Prescription" p. 15 infra.
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lars. On appeal' 5 the verdict was set aside. The plaintiff, according
to the court, had no standing to sue the polluter because he failed to
allege and prove that his lessor was a riparian owner or that either
he or his lessor was entitled to riparian rights by prescription.
The rights of a riparian owner are inseparably annexed to the
soil and pass with it as a part of it and not as an easement or appur-
tenance.16 The several proprietors along the course of a stream have
no property in the flowing water itself but each proprietor has cer-
tain rights with respect to the water."T These rights are not de-
pendent upon the proprietor's actual use or appropriation of the
flowing water.
8
The rights of riparian owners inter se are not altered by the
circumstance of a watercourse being deemed navigable or non-navi-
gable, but as will later appear,'9 a finding of navigability "injects an
ingredient of public right, resident partly in the State and partly in
the United States, which qualifies and limits the otherwise existent
rights and privileges of the bordering private owners .. .20
The riparian doctrine constitutes one of the two major legal
systems governing watercourses in the United States.2 ' Its genesis
is in feudal land law. In early Anglo-American law riparian rights
were expressed in terms of the "natural flow" rule. This rule has
been succinctly described as follows:
Designed to protect . . .milling, navigation and recreation, the
doctrine accorded to the owner of lands servient to the stream the
right to have the flow continue by or through his lands undimin-
ished in quantity and unpolluted in quality except for such diver-
sions as other riparians might make to provide for the natural
wants of man and maintain life upon their riparian lands. These
natural uses were severely limited in quantity to such water as
might be necessary for drinking, bathing, watering farm animals,
and the irrigation of garden crops designed for consumption upon
1 Young v. City of Asheville, 241 N.C. 618, 86 S.E.2d 408 (1955). The
Commissioner of Agriculture obtained an injunction against the sale or
disposition of the crop which had been irrigated from Beaverdam Creek
which was polluted by defendant's sewage.
Smith v. Town of Morganton, 187 N.C. 801, 123 S.E. 88 (1924).
' Durham v. Cotton Mills, 141 N.C. 615, 54 S.E. 453 (1906).
18 Smith v. Town of Morganton, 187 N.C. 801, 123 S.E. 88 (1924).
18 See p. 17 infra.
'0 5 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 710, at 351-52 (1962).
" The other major legal water system is the prior appropriation doctrine
which prevails in the more arid states. The law in several states is a hybrid
of the riparian doctrine and the prior appropriation doctrine. See generally
1 R. CLARK, WATERS AND WATER RIGRTS § 51, at 287 (1967).
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the land. Industrial uses were permitted only to the extent that
the water could be returned to the stream without substantial
diminution in quantity or impairment in quality at the point it
left the user's property.22
The rule of "natural flow" assured that most of the water in a stream
would proceed, unused and unmolested, to the sea where its fate was
certain pollution by salt water. Although this rule may have been
adequate in humid areas and during a time when the need for water
was limited, it was unsuited to meet the needs of growing popula-
tions and rising industrial use. In recognition of changing circum-
stances, the North Carolina Supreme Court adopted the American
rule or rule of reasonable use. The revised rule was stated by the
court as follows:
This doctrine finds support in our decisions which hold that a
riparian proprietor is entitled to the natural flow of a stream run-
ning through or along his land in its accustomed channel, undi-
minished in quantity and unimpaired in quality, except as may be
occasioned by the reasonable use of the water by other like
proprietors.2
3
What constitutes reasonable use, according to the court, "is a ques-
tion of fact having regard to the subject-matter and the use; the
occasion and manner of its application; its object and extent and
necessity; the nature and size of the stream; the kind of business to
which it is subservient; the importance and necessity of the use
claimed by one party and the extent of the injury caused by it to
the other."24 The court explained that "like proprietors" means that
the use of one farmer shall be judged by the use of another farmer
and one manufacturer by the customs and use of another manu-
facturer. The other interpretation would mean that "a stream not
2 Martz, Water for Mushrooming Populations, 62 W. VA. L. Iv. 1, 8
(1959).3 Smith v. Town of Morganton, 187 N.C. 801, 802-803, 123 S.E. 88, 89
(1924). The court actually applied the natural flow doctrine in dealing with
diversion by a municipality for its inhabitants. Although the plaintiff was
not making any use of the river he was awarded damages. Later the court
said: "The rule that the upper proprietor has no right to use the water to
the prejudice of the proprietor below him, or that he cannot lawfully diminish
the quantity is too broad, for it would give the lower proprietor superior
advantages over the upper and in many cases give him in effect a monopoly
of the stream." Dunlap v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 212 N.C. 814, 819,
195 S.E. 43, 47 (1938).
" Dunlap v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 212 N.C. 814, 820, 195 S.E. 43,
47 (1938).
[Vol. 46
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theretofore used for water power purposes could never be so used,
because the person who first undertook to avail himself of the water
power capabilities of a stream would find that he was not making use
thereof as other like owners." 5 Reasonable use is a concept which
deals with water in excess of domestic needs on a basis of correla-
tive rights between riparian owners.2 6 It is utilitarian in approach,
and the social utility of a use by an upper owner is taken into con-
sideration by the court in the application of the rule.
Litigation between riparian owners, in general, involves disputes
over diversion, detention or acceleration of the flow, backups and
pollution. An examination of each of these areas will show how the
doctrine of reasonable use is applied in North Carolina.
2. Diversion.
A few cases have been concerned directly with the right of an
upper riparian owners to divert water. Two, in particular, illustrate
a lenient attitude by the court toward business and industry. In one
case a preliminary injunction had been issued by the lower court to
prevent the defendant from diverting water to two thousand acres
of land suitable only for mining purposes. In setting aside the
injunction the court stated:
This new industry of gold washing may from necessity require
some modification of the general law, since for mill and mechani-
cal purposes the use of the passing water as a moving power does
not destroy, or in any considerable degree, reduce the volume
which still flowes on for the use of others. The diversion for gold
washing often at remote points, involves its total loss to others.2 7
Although the court refused to enjoin the defendant from diverting
water to "remote points" for consumptive use, it did not foreclose
2 I1d. at 818, 195 S.E. at 45-46.
2' It has sometimes been assumed that the 'natural flow' principle is
the common law principle, and that the 'reasonable use' idea is simply
a modification of that principle. Careful analysis, however, would
seem to indicate that such is not the case. Perhaps the 'reasonable
use' view was developed after the 'natural flow' doctrine, but it is not
merely a variation of it. The two views spring from fundamentally
different concepts as to what people ought to do or refrain from doing
with flowing water. They seek to achieve different ends. One view
emphasizes the right to the flow of the stream, and seeks to maintain,
as nearly as possible, the status quo of nature. The other emphasizes
the privilege of use, and seeks to promote the fullest beneficial use of
streams by the proprietors thereon. Kinyon, What Can A Riparian
Proprietor Do?, 21 MINN. L. REv. 512, 526-27 (1937).
"' Walton v. Mills, 86 N.C. 280, 285 (1882) (emphasis added).
1967]
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the possibility of a suit by lower riparian owners, including the
plaintiff, for any damages resulting from the diversion.
In another case"8 the court upheld a finding by the jury that the
diversion of 26,000 gallons a day out of a flow of 293 million gal-
lons was not unlawful or wrongful. The court reiterated that the
mere taking does not give a lower riparian owner a right to com-
plain because the water itself is not the subject of ownership. The
right of action accrues from the taking of water "in such unreason-
able quantity as to materially, substantially injure the lower pro-
prietor in some legitimate use he is making of the water."
Recently, the use of water for irrigation purposes has substan-
tially increased in North Carolina. The methods used result in a
more consumptive use than most industrial and municipal uses20 in
that the water is rarely returned to the source from which it is taken.
Under existing laws the use of water for irrigation could become
a fertile field for litigation.
The diversion of water by municipalities for use by inhabitants
is looked upon more strictly by the court than diversion by indus-
trial users. In 192480 permanent damages were awarded a lower
riparian owner against the town of Morganton notwithstanding
the fact that the plaintiff was not making any use of the water from
the stream. This decision was more in accord with the doctrine of
natural flow than the doctrine of reasonable use. In 1941a ' the
court held that a municipality, as riparian owner, had no right to
supply the needs of its inhabitants from a watercourse.
As to the relief available to riparian owners in these water dis-
putes, the court has been reluctant to grant injunctions against the
municipalities. An award for permanent damages is the more usual
relief for the riparian owners. In effect, this type of relief provides
a municipality with an "easement" to continue diverting. 2  It is
"0 Harris v. Norfolk & Western Ry., 153 N.C. 542, 69 S.E. 623 (1910).
" NORTH CAROLINA BD. OF WATER RESOURCES, SECOND REPoRT 21 (1958).
In 1836 the court referred to irrigation as one of the natural uses along with
those of one's family and cattle. This reference probably meant irrigation of
gardens. For recent developments see Heath, How Population and Economic
Trends May Affect Water Resources in North Carolina, 31 POPULAR GOV'T
9-10 (Nov. 1964). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-8.1 enacted in 1951 appeared to
require a permit for persons desiring to irrigate from streams or lakes. Be-
cause the statute was ambiguous and difficult to administer, it was repealed
by ch. 315 [1961] N.C. Sess. L.
" Smith v. Town of Morganton, 187 N.C. 801, 123 S.E. 88 (1924).
" Pernell v. City of Henderson, 220 N.C. 79, 16 S.E.2d 449 (1941).
" Cooke v. Town of Mebane, 191 N.C. 1, 131 S.E. 407 (1926). For a
[Vol. '46
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doubtful, however, if the "easement" extends beyond the amount
being diverted at the time of the award.
In a condemnation case, the court has taken the view that dam-
ages caused by a public service corporation to a lower riparian owner
are to be measured by the loss to the riparian owner and not by the
gain of the diverter.3' Since municipalities, as well as certain public
service corporations, 34 have statutory powers of condemnation, pre-
sumably, when the question arises, a diverting municipality will be
accorded equal treatment. Often a lower riparian owner will be
able to show only minimal damages, and thus the cost to the munici-
pality will be small. Finally, in some situations the law of pre-
scription may provide legal sanction for diversion by municipalities.
3. Alteration of the stream's manner of flow-detention, backups,
and acceleration.
The court early declared 5 that owners of land through which a
non-navigable stream runs may use the watercourse for purposes
of profit. When a riparian owner uses water for manufacturing3 6
and other industrial purposes, he usually erects a dam. Disputes
between riparian owners over the erection and operation of dams
have frequently been the subject of litigation. 7 Generally, one who
similar case involving a water company which supplied a municipality, see
Geer v. Durham Water Co., 127 N.C. 349, 37 S.E. 474 (1900).
" Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Moss, 220 N.C. 200, 17 S.E.2d 10(1941).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40 (1966). "All municipalities operating water
systems, and all water companies operating under charter from the State or
license may acquire by condemnation such lands and rights in lands and
water as are necessary for the successful operation and protection of their
plants. Condemnation proceedings under this section shall be the same as
prescribed by law under Chapter 40 of the General Statues of North Caro-
lina." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130-162 (1964). Rarely do municipalities find
it necessary to purchase water rights from riparian owners. Heath, Water
Use Law in Action, 28 POPULAR GOV'T 13 (March-April 1962).
"Pugh v. Wheeler, 19 N.C. 50 (1836). Ch. 1086 [1967] N.C. Sess. L.,
which provides for certification and inspection of certain dams, appears to
be the first legislation by the state of North Carolina specifically dealing with
the construction of dams on navigable waters.
"Dunlap v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 212 N.C. 814, 195 S.E. 43(1938).
" Sink v. City of Lexington, 214 N.C. 548, 200 S.E. 4 (1938) ; Carruthers
v. Tillman, 2 N.C. 501 (1797). The court is reluctant to grant an injunction
in these cases and is inclined to leave the plaintiff to prove his damages.
Tucker & Carter Rope Co. v. Southern Aluminum Co., 165 N.C. 572, 81
S.E 771 (1914). See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 73 (1965) for legislation on the
subject of "Mills," much of which dates from the early nineteenth century.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 73-27 (1965) is specifically directed to avoiding a multi-
plicity of suits when the annual damage is less than twenty dollars.
19671
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lawfully erects a dam is entitled to detain the water long enough to
accumulate a sufficient head for manufacturing purposes. Disputes
occur when the dam causes flooding or ponding on the lands of an
upper riparian owner, or when a lower riparian owner is damaged
by an unusual retardation or acceleration of the flow by an upper
riparian owner.
A lower mill owner has been held liable for damage to the land
and machinery of an upper mill owner due to an overflow caused
by water backing up, even though the overflow did not occur except
when the stream was swollen.88 The court also has held that an
upper riparian owner is entitled to go to the jury on an alleged in-
jury to his land caused by a retardation of drainage. The land could
not drain because the defendant's dam backed water close to the
bottom land of the plaintiff.89 An owner of a dam may be held
liable for flooding the land of an upper riparian owner because he
negligently fails to release water frequently enough to prevent sand
from filling up the stream bed, thereby creating a flood condition
above the dam.4"
One who detains water must not release it in such a manner as
to injure the property of a lower riparian owner. If he does so,
the upper mill owner will be held liable."1 The fact that the de-
fendant in the operation of a hydroelectric dam closed the flood-
gates at night, causing a substantial decrease in the water in the
channel of the Yadkin River, and opened the floodgates in the morn-
ing resulting in an accelerated flow until the stream was normal
did not constitute an unreasonable use; nevertheless, if the release
of the water caused the banks of the plaintiff's property to wash
away, the defendant would be liable in damages on the theory of
taking or appropriating property of another.42
The owner of a dam is required to exercise ordinary care in
anticipating flood conditions from an ordinary freshet and to use
reasonable care in preventing undue acceleration or retardation of
the flood water.4 3 In determining the question of reasonable care
'
8 Pugh v. Wheeler, 19 N.C. 50 (1836).
"Sink v. City of Lexington, 214 N.C. 548, 200 S.E. 4 (1938).
,Teseneer v. Henrietta Mills Co., 209 N.C. 615, 184 S.E. 535 (1936).
"Kitchen Lumber Co. v. Tallassee Power Co., 206 N.C. 515, 174 S.E.
427 (1934) (destruction of bridge).
42 Dunlap v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 212 N.C. 814, 195 S.E. 43
(1938).
" Bruton v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 217 N.C. 1, 6 S.E.2d 822
(1939).
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toward the lower riparian owner, the court will consider the cor-
relative duty of the owner of the dam not to cause injury to an
upper riparian owner.4" Unprecedented storms or rainfall need not
be anticipated. However, the owner of a dam will be held liable if
he is negligent in the operation of the dam, and such negligence is
a contributing factor in the cause of the damage by an Act of God.4 5
4. Pollution.
The "natural flow" doctrine provided that a riparian owner was
entitled to receive the natural flow of a stream undiminished in
quantity and unimpaired in quality." The doctrine included quali-
fications which permitted the upper riparian owner to supply his
domestic needs.4 Such permissible use implied that the lower ripa-
rian owner could not expect the water to be absolutely pure. The
adoption of the reasonable use rule permitting a riparian owner to
use water for "purposes of profit"48 in addition to his domestic needs
necessarily implied that these additional uses also might impair the
original purity of the water.4 9 Thus the law must strike a balance
between the reasonable use by an upper riparian owner and the right
of the lower riparian owner to receive the water without excessive
diminution in quality. Delicate questions may arise on this issue,
but so far the cases involve the more serious problems of pollution
growing out of the discharge of sewage and industrial wastes into
watercourses. Typically, these suits are brought by a riparian owner
against a non-riparian polluter but occasionally the polluter is also a
riparian owner." Plaintiffs in these suits may assert nuisance 51 or
& Id.
"Id. Commissioners v. Jennings, 181 N.C. 393, 107 S.E. 312 (1921)
(unprecedented storm).
"Durham v. Cotton Mills, 141 N.C. 615, 54 S.E. 453 (1906).
"Pugh v. Wheeler, 19 N.C. 50 (1836).8 Id. at 54.
""The word 'pollution' has different meanings for different people. To
some it is raw sewage; to others it is toxic and smelly chemicals, and to the
angler it is temperatures too high for trout or bass. To approach the pollu-
tion problem realistically, one must include as pollution all the activities of
man that in any way degrade the quality of water." SENATE SELECT COMMIT-
TEE ON NATIONAL WATER RESOURCES, NATIONAL WATER REOURCES AND
PROBLEMS 25 (Comm. Print No. 3, 1960).
'0 Pernell v. City of Henderson, 220 N.C. 79, 16 S.E.2d 449 (1941) (cause
of action for nuisance); Cook v. Town of Mebane, 191 N.C. 1, 131 S.E. 407
(1926) (award of 6000 dollars damages to land and mill site approved).
"' The court approved the following charge to the jury: "Now, gentlemen,
a nuisance is anything which works hurt, inconvenience or damage, or which
essentially interferes with the enjoyment of life or property, and the pollution
of water by the discharge into a stream of matters which are offensive in
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damage in the nature of trespass against his property rights. But
according to the court:
Whether we say this is an action for damages resulting from a
continuing trespass or for the maintenance of a nuisance or accord
it some other name is immaterial. Irrespective of the nomencla-
ture used, it is in essence an action in tort for the wrongful dam-
age to and taking of the land of plaintiffs, without compensation
for private gain.52
With reference to standing, at common law when only the rights
of the general public were injured by pollution, prosecution had to be
in the name of the state. In 1826 in a suit instituted by the city of
Raleigh an injunction was granted to prohibit the erection of a dam
and the operation of a mill on the ground that to permit its operation
would adversely affect the health of the inhabitants.5 4 In 1903 the
General Assembly enacted a statute which authorized "any person"
to seek an injunction against the pollution of a public water supply.55
In 1917, this statute was invoked successfully against the town of
Louisburg. 6 These cases, however, are not typical inasmuch as the
courts have been reluctant to enjoin polluters either under the com-
mon law or under the 1903 statute.
In 1935 the town of Smithfield51 sued the city of Raleigh to
odor or which renders(sic) it unfit for such use as it had heretofore been
reasonably put to, is a nuisance." Cook v. Town of Mebane, 191 N.C. 1, 6,
131 S.E. 407, 410 (1926).
"Phillips v. Hasset Mining Co., 244 N.C. 17, 21, 92 S.E.2d 429, 432(1956). (Plaintiff's lands were damaged by overflow of dirt, silt and refuse
dumped into the stream. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 74-31 (1965) which authorizes
such discharge in connection with mining of kaolin and mica apparently in-
sulates the defendant from injunction suits).
' Banks v. Town of Burnsville, 228 N.C. 553, 46 S.E.2d 559 (1948).(Court stated that a non-riparian owner would not be entitled to an injunction
unless the defendant was maintaining a nuisance and plaintiff alleged and
proved that he suffered special damages as a result).5 Attorney-Gen. ex rel. Citizens of Raleigh v. Hunter, 16 N.C. 12 (1826).
"
5Now N.C. Gm. STAT. § 130-165 (1964). The 1967 wording is as
follows:
No person or municipality shall flow or discharge sewage or industrial
waste above the intake into any source from which a public drinking
water supply is taken, unless said sewage or industrial waste shall have
passed through some system of purification approved by the State
Board of Health and Board of Water and Air Resources; and the con-
tinued flow and discharge of such sewage may be enjoined.
Ch. 892, § 3(b) [1967] N.C. Sess. L.
"' North Carolina State Bd. of Health v. Commissioners, 173 N.C. 250,
91 S.E. 1019 (1917).
" Town of Smithfield v. City of Raleigh, 207 N.C. 597, 178 S.E. 114(1935).
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enjoin it from emptying the raw sewage of 42,000 people in the
Neuse River, the source of the water supply of the plaintiff. The
city of Raleigh had violated the 1903 statute, and it had ignored an
order of compliance issued by the state Board of Health prior to
the institution of the suit. Due to the financial distress of the
Capitol City, the court did not issue an injunction. The court
recognized that the 1903 statute did not require proof that an actual
injury had occurred before an injunction could be ordered, but it
also observed that it was not mandatory that an injunction should
be granted. It concluded:
Notwithstanding, common sense is older than the common law,
statutory law, or equity, and this saving grace of human experi-
ence must be reckoned with in determining the application of
technical rules of behavior. 58
The city of Raleigh was admonished to comply with the law, and
the town of Smithfield was informed that it was not estopped to
try again. In 1948 a new suit was brought and the superior court
ruled that the city of Raleigh must install sewage treatment facilities
by January 1, 1956. 9 On November 10, 1956, the city of Raleigh
ceased discharging untreated sewage into the Neuse River.
Though the disposal of sewage is in the exercise of a govern-
mental function, nevertheless, a municipality that pollutes one's
property is liable for damages. In effect, such injury is a taking
or appropriation for which compensation must be paid."0 The fact
that a municipality complies with the requirements of the state Board
of Health does not insulate it from liability for damages caused by
pollution."1 Many successful suits for damages have been prose-
cuted against municipalities by riparian owners. 2 In one case the
court was not deterred even though the record indicated that thirty
Id. at 600, 178 S.E. at 116.
' P. GREEN, D. HAYMAN, & E. MACHE, STREAMi POLLUTION IN NoRTH
CAROLINA 13-15 (1951).
"0 Donnell v. City of Greensboro, 164 N.C. 330, 80 S.E. 377 (1913).
"'-Id. Apparently compliance will preclude injunctive relief.
" Spaugh v. City of Winston-Salem, 249 N. C. 194, 105 S.E.2d 610 (1958)(1500 dollars awarded for temporary damage to home tract due to noxious
odors and 1200 dollars awarded for temporary damage to sand producing
lands); Wagner v. Town of Conover, 200 N.C. 82, 156 S.E. 167 (1930)(1750 dollars awarded for permanent damages to land); Cook v. Town of
Mebane, 191 N.C. 1, 131 S.E. 407 (1926) (6000 dollars awarded for injufy
to property); Donnell v. City of Greensboro, 164 N.C. 330, 80 S.E. 377(1913) (1000 dollars permanent damages awarded for injury to property).
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or forty suits of like kind were pending against the city."3 A non-
riparian owner is entitled to recover damages when his property is
sufficiently affected by noxious gases and odors. 4
In suits against industrial polluters, like in those against munici-
palities, courts have rarely granted injunctions. In at least two
instances,"5 however, riparian owners were granted restraining or-
ders pending outcome of trial at the common law, and in one case,"'
under the 1903 statute, the court enjoined a textile plant from dis-
charging sewage in the Eno River, the source of water supply for
the city of Durham.
A riparian owner may join a municipality and a manufacturing
corporation (or an individual) in the same suit on the theory that
the stream was polluted by their several, joint, and concurrent acts. 7
But a corporation using the city sewage system is not a proper co-
defendant because the inhabitants of a city are not individually
liable for the operation of the municipal sewage system. 8 Perma-
nent damages may be awarded for pollution against municipalities
and other corporations having statutory powers of eminent domain.
In a suit for permanent damages, the proceeding is grounded upon
a partial taking of another's property, and the outcome, if successful,
in effect gives the defendant an easement to continue the activity.,,
Thus even though a corporate defendant may not have powers of
condemnation, the parties may consent to the awarding of perma-
nent damages with the same result as if it had such powers. 71
Other actions arising out of pollution of watercourses include
one in which the defendant was polluting a stream under authority
of a North Carolina statute"' which authorizes miners of kaolin and
" Donnell v. City of Greensboro, 164 N.C. 330, 80 S.E. 377 (1913).
"4 Rhodes v. City of Durham, 165 N.C. 679, 81 S.E. 938 (1914) (plain-
tiff's property located approximately fifty yards from the polluted stream).
" Finger v. Rex Spinning Co., 190 N.C. 74, 128 S.E. 467 (1925) ; Rhyne
v. Flint Mfg. Co., 182 N.C. 489, 109 S.E. 376 (1921).
" Durham v. Cotton Mills, 141 N.C. 615, 54 S.E. 453 (1906); same case
in 144 N.C. 705, 57 S.E. 465 (1907).
6" Stowe v. City of Gastonia, 231 N.C. 157, 56 S.E.2d 413 (1949).
"Hampton v. Town of Spindale, 210 N.C. 546, 187 S.E. 775 (1936).
" Brown v. Virginia-Carolina Chem. Co., 162 N.C. 84, 77 S.E. 1102(1913). For measure of damages see Lightner v. City of Raleigh, 206 N.C.
496, 174 S.E. 272 (1934).
70 Clinard v. Town of Kenersville, 215 N.C. 745, 3 S.E.2d 267 (1939);
Langley v. Staley Hosiery Mills Co., 194 N.C. 644, 140 S.E. 440 (1927).1 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 74-31 (1965) now reads: "In getting out and wash-
ing the products of kaolin and mica mines, the persons engaged in such busi-
ness shall have the right to allow the waste, water, and sediment to run off
into the natural courses and streams."
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mica to discharge waste, water, and sediment into natural water-
courses. The court has held 72 that this statute does not preclude one
who is injured thereby from suing for damages. But since this
statute appears to run afoul the North Carolina Water and Air
Resources Act of 1967,"3 the General Assembly should cleanse the
"books" by expressly repealing it. Another action involving pollu-
tion arose in 1943, when a riparian owner alleged that the defendant
polluted the waters by discharging industrial waste and thereby
prevented the migration of fish to his nets. Though a riparian
owner on a navigable stream has no property right in fish in a wild
state, the court held74 that the plaintiff stated a cause of action for
damages to his property including his fishing business.
5. Acquisition of Water Rights by Prescription.
An easement may be acquired by prescription. For example,
it is unlawful for a lower riparian owner by erecting a dam to cause
water to pond on the land of an upper riparian owner. But if the
ponding continues for the requisite period of time (usually twenty
years) under circumstances the court deems adverse, the lower ri-
parian owner will acquire an easement by prescription to continue
backing up water on the land of the upper riparian owner. The
burden is on the riparian owner who asserts prescriptive rights to
prove that the ponding was visible, notorious, continuous, adverse,
and under claim of right75 because the law presumes that the flood-
ing was permissible.76  The court has held that a lower riparian
"Phillips v. Hasset Mining Co., 244 N.C. 17, 92 S.E.2d 429 (1956);
McKinney v. Deneen, 231 N.C. 540, 58 S.E.2d 107 (1950).
Ch. 892 [1967] N.C. Sess. L.
' In the words of the court:
The law will not permit a substantial injury to the person or property
by a nuisance, though public and indictable, to go without individual
redress, whether the right of action be referred to the existence of a
special damage, or to an invasion of a more particular and more im-
portant personal right. The personal right involved here is the se-
curity of an established business. The fact that plaintiff had such
established business antedating the nuisance, and that the injury had
been done to this, takes him out of the rule and makes his damage
special and particular.
Hampton v. North Carolina Pulp Co., 223 N.C. 535, 547, 27 S.E.2d 538, 545
(1943).
"' In the early cases the court used a curious mixture of the language of
"lost grant" and adverse possession when discussing easements and water
rights by prescription. Gradually, the "lost grant" ingredient has faded out
and presumably may now itself be lost. See Note, 45 N.C.L. REV. 284 (1966).
" Darr v. Carolina Aluminum Co., 215 N.C. 768, 3 S.E.2d 434 (1939);
Perry v. White, 185 N.C. 79, 116 S.E. 84 (1923).
1967]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
owner who has acquired an easement by prescription to pond the
land of an upper riparian owner cannot build a bigger or better dam
and thereby pond a larger area inasmuch as the easement is limited
to the area involved in the prescriptive period."
Taking water from a watercourse in excess of one's rights, or
by one with no right to divert at all, does not in its strictest sense
involve the law of easements, but it is so nearly in the nature of an
easement that the same general principles apply." The court implied
in a recent case79 that a non-riparian owner might acquire a right
to take water for irrigation purposes by prescription. The case was
not decided on this basis because the complaint failed to allege that
the plaintiff had acquired prescriptive rights, notwithstanding the
fact that the diversion had been going on for thirty or thirty-five
years.
At common law a riparian owner is permitted to cause some
pollution of a watercourse incident to his right of user. May he
acquire by prescription a right to pollute to an extent greater than
is permissible by common right? If the act of pollution amounts
to a public nuisance, it is clear that he cannot8 ° because there is no
such thing as acquiring a right to maintain a public nuisance by
prescription. Since the scope of public nuisance is being enlarged
by legislation, a polluter has at most a theoretical"1 possibility in a
narrow area to establish a right by prescription to continue his
practices.
Only very infrequently does one acquire an easement or a water
right in the nature of an easement by prescription in North Caro-
lina. The law presumes the user to be permissive; and thus it is
difficult for the claimant to make out his case for the right to pond,
flood, or divert. As indicated, the right to pollute is severely limited
by the inapplicability of the law of prescription to a public nuisance.
In the future, prescriptive rights are likely to be asserted in cases
involving diversion for irrigation and diversion by municipalities
7 Powell v. Lash, 64 N.C. 456 (1870).
78 Geer v. Durham Water Co., 127 N.C. 349, 37 S.E. 474 (1900).
Young v. City of Asheville, 241 N.C. 618, 86 S.E.2d 408 (1955).80 Town of Shelby v. Cleveland Mill & Power Co., 155 N.C. 196, 71 S.E.
218 (1911).
"' North Carolina Bd. of Health v. Comm'rs, 173 N.C. 250, 254, 91 S.E.
1019, 1022 (1917): "There are authorities to the effect that as against a
private individual lower down on the stream, the right to pollute to a greater
extent than is permissible at common law may be acquired by prescription
by an upper riparian owner."
[Vol. 46
NORTH CAROLINA WATER USE LAW
for their inhabitants, in those instances where the right has not
otherwise been established.
6. Navigable Watercourses.
A person who owns land adjacent to a watercourse-whether
navigable or non-navigable-is a riparian owner. However, a ri-
parian owner along a navigable watercourse does not per se own
any part of the bed. The General Assembly has declared8 2 that title
to "submerged lands" belongs to the state, and this term is defined
to mean land which lies beneath any navigable waters within the
boundaries of the state or the Atlantic Ocean to a distance of three
geographical miles seaward from the coastline of the state. The
following statement was made recently by the court:
It is settled law in this State that the State of North Carolina
owns the land within its territorial limits covered by navigable
waters, except as far as private rights in it have been acquired by
express grant by the State, and subject to the rights of control
of the Federal Government over commerce with foreign nations
and among the several states, including its power over naviga-
tion.8 3
The policy of the state has been against making land under navigable
waters subject to entry and grant and apparently only a limited
number of such grants have been made."'
In determining the navigability of a particular watercourse, the
"ebbing and flowing" of the tides was once applied as the criterion,
but this test was ultimately rejected by the court as unrealistic. 5
Under this test the Albemarle and Pamlico Sounds which are "in-
82 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 146-64(6) (7) (1964). The state also has title to
"swamp lands" which are defined in subsection (8) as follows: "'Swamp
lands' means lands too wet for cultivation except by drainage, and includes
(a) All State lands which have been or are known as 'swamp' or 'marsh'
lands, 'pocosin bay', 'briary bay' or savanna', and which are a part of one
swamp exceeding 2,000 acres in area, or which are a part of one swamp 2,000
acres or less in area which has been surveyed by the State; and (b) All
State lands which are covered by the waters of any State owned lake or
pond."82 Miller v. Coppage, 261 N.C. 430, 435, 135 S.E.2d 1, 5 (1964).
B, Swan Island Club v. Yarbrough, 209 F.2d 698 (4th Cir. 1954) ; Resort
Dev. Co. v. Parmele, 235 N.C. 689, 71 S.E.2d 474 (1952) (court casts doubt
on validity of grants made between 1837-1841, a period when there was no
legislation forbidding grants for land under navigable waters); Shepard's
Point Land Co. v. Atlantic Hotel, 132 N. C. 517, 44 S.E. 39 (1903) (history
of legislation concerning grants of land under navigable waters included).
As early as 1828 the court discussed the inappropriateness of the "ebbing
and flowing" test. Wilson v. Forbes, 13 N.C. 30 (1828). But this test was
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land seas" would be subject to private property. The test substi-
tuted by the court-that navigable waters means all waters which
are navigable in fact8 -- now has legislative sanction.8 7  Water-
courses are navigable in fact, according to the court, if in their
ordinary state they have capacity and suitability for the usual pur-
pose of navigation by vessels or boats such as are employed in the
ordinary course of water commerce, trade, and travel.8" The ca-
pacity of the water for such use rather than actual use is sufficient.8"
Although the riparian owner does not own the bed of a navi-
gable watercourse, he does own the banks," and he is entitled to
certain rights by virtue of this fact. Those navigating the water-
applied in 1846. Hatfield v. Grimstead, 29 N.C. 139 (1846). By 1901 the
court fully accepted the "navigable in fact" test. State v. Baum, 128 N.C.
600, 38 S.E. 900 (1901). The court assumed from the outset that the "ebbing
and flowing" test was the common law of England.
The following statement appears in 56 Am~s. JuR. Waters § 178 (1947):
This view as to the common-law rule [ebbing and flowing] has for its
foundation an erroneous declaration by Chancellor Kent in an early de-
sion which he later carried into his Commentaries . . . [An] exami-
nation of the English decisions and the works of the textwriters of
the time leads to the conclusion that the tidal test of navigability has
never been the rule of the English courts, but that rather the question
has been determined with respect to actual usability for navigation.86 Parmele v. Eaton, 240 N.C. 539, 83 S.E.2d 93 (1954); State v. Baum,
128 N.C. 600, 38 S.E. 900 (1901).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 146-64(4) (1964).88Parmele v. Eaton, 240 N.C. 539, 83 S.E.2d 93 (1954). Navigable
waters of the United States include those waters which could be made navi-
gable in fact by the construction of reasonable improvements and have a
connection with other waters to form a channel or highway for commerce
among the states or with foreign nations. United States v. Appalachian
Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940); rehearing denied, 312 U.S. 712
(1941); Note, 19 N.C.L. Rxv. 379 (1941).
"Taylor v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 262 N.C. 452, 137 S.E.2d
833 (1964); Elizabeth City Water & Power Co. v. City of Elizabeth City,
188 N.C. 278, 124 S.E. 611 (1924); State v. Twiford, 136 N.C. 603, 48 S.E.
586 (1904). The Roanoke River was held to be navigable even though in-
tercepted by falls because it is navigable for considerable distances above and
below the falls. Broadnax v. Baker, 94 N.C. 675 (1886); Swan Island Club
v. White, 114 F. Supp. 95 (E.D.N.C. 1953) (Currituck Sound). The court
has expanded its concept of navigability since its decision in State v. Glen, 52
N.C. 321 (1859) and it is doubtful if the classification of watercourses made
in that decision is now accurate. The so-called "floatable" streams are
streams which are non-navigable; but nevertheless, may meet the test
of "floatability" which entitles one to an easement to float logs. The
stream must be one in which a businessman "may calculate that, with toler-
able regularity as to seasons, the water will rise to and remain at such height
as will enable them to make profitable use as a highway for transporting logs
to mills or markets lower down." Commissioners v. Catawba Lumber Co.,
116 N.C. 731, 734, 21 S.E. 941, 942 (1895).90 O'Neal v. Rollinson, 212 N.C. 83, 192 S.E. 688 (1937).
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course have no right to land upon or use the bank without his con-
sent." In the absence of restrictive legislation he has a right of
access over his water front to navigable water. Subject to such
regulations as may be imposed by the legislature, he has a right to
construct wharves, piers, and landings on the water frontage. 2 He
may seek judicial relief by way of injunction against the acts of
persons interfering with his right of access.93 A riparian owner
on a navigable watercourse is entitled to relicted land,94 to land built
up by any process of nature, 95 and to land built up by the erection of
any pier, jetty, or breakwater.9 6 He is also authorized by legislation
to apply for an easement to fill in the area immediately in front of
his land.97 The right of a riparian owner to fish, hunt, and take
wild game in or on navigable waters is in common with the general
public.9  The public right to navigation, however, is paramount.9
7. Conclusion on Riparian Rights in Watercourses.
Except for a few statutory modifications,"0 the doctrine of ri-
parian rights in North Carolina is a product of judicial decision.
Gaither v. Albemarle Hosp., 235 N.C. 431, 70 S.E.2d 680 (1952).
Jones v. Turlington, 243 N.C. 681, 92 S.E.2d 75 (1956).
"Gaither v. Albemarle Hosp., 235 N.C. 431, 70 S.E.2d 680 (1952);
O'Neal v. Rollinson, 212 N.C. 83, 192 S.E. 688 (1937).
" Hodges v. Williams, 95 N.C. 331 (1886) (Relicted land results from a
recession of water. A riparian owner is not entitled to relicted land if the
bed of the navigable stream has been granted to another.).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 146-6(a) (1964); Jones v. Turlington, 243 N.C.
681, 92 S.E.2d 75 (1956).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 146-6(a) (1964). This statute further provides:
the tract, title to which is thus vested in a riparian owner, shall include
only the front of his formerly riparian tract and shall be confined
within the extension of his property lines, which extensions shall be
perpendicular to the channel, or main watercourses.
"
7N.C. GEN. STAT. § 146-6(c) (1964).
08 Hampton v. North Carolina Pulp Co., 223 N.C. 535, 27 S.E.2d 538(1943); State v. Twiford, 136 N.C. 603, 48 S.E. 586 (1904); State v. Glen,
52 N.C. 321 (1859); Swan Island Club v. White, 114 F. Supp. 95 (E.D.N.C.
1953), aff'd, Swan Island Club v. Yarbrough, 209 F.2d 698 (4th Cir. 1954).
:'Jackson v. Keeling, 46 N.C. 299 (1854).
N0 .C. GEN. STAT. § 73-5 (1965) provides a riparian owner on one side
of a stream power to condemn land on the opposite side for purposes of
erecting a mill. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 139-18(b) (1) (1964), a provision in
the Small Watershed Act, prohibits the diversion of water from one water-
shed to another. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153-293 (1964) specifically prohibits
counties and cities under the Water and Sewage Facilities Act from diverting
water from any major river basin, the main stem of which is not located
entirely within North Carolina downstream from the point of such diversion,
except where such diversion is now permitted by law. Nantahala Power &
Light Co. v. Moss, 220 N.C. 200, 17 S.E.2d 10 (1941). These and related
anti-diversion laws are discussed in Heath, Water Use Law in Action, 28
POPULAR GOV'T 13 (March-April 1962).
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There are hazards in undertaking to define this doctrine. On one
occasion the court was prompted to say:
In each case the particular becomes so blended with the general,
the specific so definitely a part of the universal, that he must in-
deed be a deft and expert craftsman who undertakes to excise
that which is general law.'01
Then, too, there are many unanswered questions. A few examples
may be helpful. What is the physical extent of riparian land?..2
Does land (or an interest less than a fee) acquired by a riparian
owner adjacent to his existing riparian land also become riparian
land? If several riparian owners need water for irrigation and the
supply is insufficient to meet the needs of all, who prevails?
The riparian doctrine, fluid in nature, may have been adequate
to meet changing needs in the past when water was plentiful relative
to need, and its use was mainly for non-consumptive purposes; but as
the demands on water resources grow, the necessity for legislation
to define more explicitly the relations between riparian owners will
become more evident.'0 3
Diffused Surface Waters
Diffused surface waters may result from rainfall, melting snows,
seepage, springs, or overflow waters which become separated per-
manently from their stream source.'0 4 Such waters differ from
natural streams in that they are vagrant, are spread over the sur-
face of the ground without observable channels or banks, and have
no predictable flow. The common law rule concerning the use of
diffused surface waters, including intra-tract reservoirs and ponds,
is that they belong to the person who captures or retains them upon
his own land.0 5 Such person has a proprietary right and may
divert water for any private or commercial use.'06 Diffused surface
"' Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Moss, 220 N.C. 200, 209, 17 S.E.2d
10, 16 (1941).
.0. Note, 34 N.C.L. R-v. 247 (1956).
... Power, paper, and chemical interests in the recent North Carolina
hearings implied "considerable satisfaction in the security of the riparian
system in North Carolina, especially (from their point of view) if not sup-
plemented by regulatory controls." WIsE MANAGEMENT-FINAL REPORT 16.
... 6A AMFRIcAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 28.61 (A.J. Casner ed. 1954).
10. Dolson, Diffitsed Surface Water and Riparian Rights: Legal Doctrines
in Conflict, 1966 Wis. L. Rzv. 58, 59.006A AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra, note 104, at § 28.62.
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water in an artificial pond is generally considered the private prop-
erty of the owner of the land who impounds it." 7 Existing legis-
lation concerning use of diffused surface water in the eastern states,
almost without exception, codifies the common law of absolute
ownership.' In the absence of judicial or statutory modification,
it may be presumed that the common law of absolute ownership
currently prevails in North Carolina." 9 It is apparent that the cap-
ture and impoundment of diffused surface waters in reservoirs will
become more important as a source of water supply." Ultimately
disputes will develop between owners of land in North Carolina over
the use of diffused surface water, and alteration of the common law
on this point may become necessary, just as it became necessary in
the law of watercourses and underground water.
Traditionally, the owners of land have been more concerned with
their right to rid themselves of diffused surface waters than with
their rights to capture and use them. There is a substantial body
of law in North Carolina involving the rights and duties of the upper
and lower landowners toward each other in respect to the disposition
of diffused surface waters."' This aspect of the law of diffused
surface waters will not be included in this discussion of water use.
... Dolson, Diffwsed Surface Water and Riparian Rights: Legal Doctrines
in CoRflict, 1966 Wxs. L. REv. 58.
... Heath, Water Management Legislation in the Eastern States, 2 LANiI
AND WATER L. REv. 99 (1967).
.0. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 4-1 (1953). Statute reads as follows:
All such parts of the common law as were heretofore in force and use
within this State, or so much of the common law as is not destructive
of, or repugnant to, or inconsistent with, the freedom and independence
of this State and the form of government therein established, and which
has not been otherwise provided for in whole or in part, not abrogated,
repealed, or become obsolete, are hereby declared to be in full force
within this State.
'"oN.C. GEN. STAT. § 139 (1964) as amended by ch. 987 [1967] N.C.
Sess. L. (concerning Soil and Water Conservation Districts, Watershed
Improvement Districts and including utilization as well as conservation and
disposal.) Heath, Small Watershed Programs, 26 POPULAR GOV'T 18 (March-
April 1960); Heath, Small Watershed Enabling Laws, 26 POPUi.R GOV'T
2 (Nov. 1959); Heath, Water Resources, 25 PoPtA Gov'T 22, 24 (Jurie
1959).
11..2 WISE MANAGEMENT app. D at D7. Illustrative cases are: Sherrill
v. Highway Comm., 264 N.C. 643, 142 S.E.2d 653 (1965) ; Midgett v. High-
way Comm. 260 N.C. 241, 132 S.E.2d 599 (1960) (Included in the opinion
is a discussion of the common-enemy doctrine and the civil-law doctrine.
North Carolina adheres to the latter); Phillips v. Chesson, 231 N.C. 566,
58 S.E.2d 343 (1950); Davis v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 227 N.C. 561,
43 S.E.2d 82 (1947) (Court deals with the obligation of the owner of higher
land to the owner of lower land).
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Underground Water
About one sixth of the annual precipation in the piedmont and
coastal plain areas sinks into the pores and other openings in the
soil and underlying rocks and becomes subterranean or underground
water (sometimes referred to as "ground water" as distinguished
from surface water).112 In 1956 it was estimated that about three-
fourths of the population of North Carolina used "ground water"
for domestic water supply."" This included almost all people in rural
areas and 175 of the state's 335 municipalities having public water
supplies. In the same year it was estimated that more than 100
million gallons of underground water was used daily for industrial
purposes. A decade later one industry in eastern North Carolina,
in order to mine phosphate by the dry-pit method, pumped "ground"
water from the Castle Hayne limestone at the rate of sixty-five mil-
lion gallons a day.14 In 1966 the Department of Water Resources
made the following observation:
Ground water continues to be the principal source of domestic
water supplies in the State. In addition, development of ground
water supplies for industrial, commercial and agricultural sup-
plies is increasing rapidly in much of the State and is expected
to continue. Although conflicts among water users resulting
from ground water development are not yet statewide, some criti-
cal problems have already arisen .... 11r
Problems of "ground" water are of recent origin and the number
of decided cases is small compared to those involving watercourses;
nevertheless, the court has developed rather precise rules governing
the use of "ground water."
The court has classified" 6 subterranean or underground or
"ground water" as follows:
(1) subterranean water flowing in well defined channels;
(2) subterranean or underground percolating waters.
Although subterranean streams or bodies of water flowing in a
fixed or definite channel are rare, and probably do not exist in North
11 DEWIEST 35.
... REPORT OF THE N.C. BD. OF WATER COMAI'RS 45 (1956).
..' DEWIEST 116.
1162 WIsE MAXAGEMENT app. G at G23.
... Jones v. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 252 N.C. 626, 114 S.E.2d 638
(1960).
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Carolina, 1 7 the court has expressed itself on the applicable law as
follows :118
(a) The rules of law applicable to surface streams, so far as
practicable, apply to underground streams;
(b) To qualify as a subterranean stream or body of water its
existence and location must be ascertainable without exca-
vation;
(c) Unless it appears that underground water in a given case
flows in a defined and known channel, it will be presumed
to be percolating water;
(d) Thus the burden of establishing the existence of an under-
ground stream rests upon the party who alleges such fact.
Cases involving underground percolating or "ground" water deal
with problems of diversion, obstruction, and pollution. They will
be discussed in this order.
1. Diversion.
The court first dealt with the diversion of "ground" water in a
case decided in 1924.119 The plaintiff purchased about six hundred
acres of land in two tracts. The water was bad. He sank wells
and procured deep artesian water at a cost of several thousand
dollars. The defendant, city of Kinston, then purchased a half acre
of land adjoining the tracts of the plaintiff, and began sinking deep
wells with the expressed purpose of transporting the water to the
city in a ten inch main. Subsequently, two of the plaintiff's wells
ceased to flow, and the flow of a third well was decreased from
approximately 100 gallons to eight gallons a minute. The trial court
awarded the plaintiff 8,000 dollars damages for injury to his wells.
On appeal the court rejected the "English rule" which gives a land-
11 DEWIEST 141-42. This report further stated:
Under-ground streams do occur in limestone terranes as a result of
solution of the limestone by ground water percolating along fissues or
cracks. Examples of underground streams are found in the Luray
Caverns in Virginia, the Mammoth Cave in Kentucky, and the Carls-
bad Caverns in New Mexico.
See Masten v. Texas Co., 194 N.C. 540, 140 S.E. 89 (1927) (the court re-
ferred to a "vein" of water).
... Jones v. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 252 N.C. 626, 114 S.E.2d 638
(1960).
... Rouse v. City of Kinston, 188 N.C. 1, 123 S.E. 482 (1924). Note, 3
N.C.L. REv. 31 (1925).
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owner the absolute property in percolating water, together with the
right to prevent its passage to adjoining land. The court said:
We think the American rule, adopted in most of the states where
this question has arisen, the 'reasonable use' of percolating water,
the correct rule. The beauty of the common law is that it is elastic
and at all times fitted to meet modern life and changing condi-
tions when consonant with right and justice. We think there is
no error in the charge of the court below, as follows:
"This rule [American Rule] does not prevent the private use by
any landowner of percolating waters subjacent to his soil, in
manufacturing, agriculture, irrigation, or otherwise; nor does it
prevent any reasonable development of his land by mining, or
the like, although by such use the underground percolating waters
of his neighbors may be thus interfered with or diverted; but it
does prevent the withdrawal of underground waters for distri-
bution or sale, for uses not connected with any beneficial owner-
ship or enjoyment of the land from which they are taken, if it
thereby follows that the owner of adjacent land is interfered with
in his right to the reasonable use of subsurface water upon his
own land, or if his wells, springs or streams are thereby mate-
rially diminished in flow or his land rendered less valuable for
agriculture, pasturage, or for legitimate uses. . . . I therefore
charge you that, in the absence of contract or legislative enact-
ment, whatever is reasonable for the owner to do with his sub-
surface water, he may do. He may make the most of it that he
reasonably can. It is not unreasonable for him to dig wells and
take therefrom all the waters that he needs in order to get the
fullest enjoyment and usefulness from his land, for the purposes
of abode, productiveness of the soil, or manufacture, or whatever
else the land is capable of. He may consume it at will; but, to
fit it up with wells and pumps of such pervasive and potential
reach that from their base he can tap the waters stored in the
lands of others, and thus lead them to his own land, and by mer-
chandising it, prevent its return, to the injury of adjoining land-
owners, is an unreasonable use of the soil, and in such event the
injured neighbor may bring his action for damages.' 120
The court decided that it was unreasonable for the city of
Kinston to divert water from its half-acre of land for uses uncon-
nected with its legitimate activity on that land. Judgment for the
plaintiff was affirmed.
In 1962 the court had occasion to apply the reasonable use rule
to mining or quarrying for the first time. In this case1 21 the de-
120 188 N.C. at 23-24, 123 S.E. at 493.
... Bayer v. Nello L. Teer Co., 256 N.C. 509, 124 S.E.2d 552 (1962).
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fendant, who operated a rock quarry on the land adjacent to the
plaintiff's lot, pumped percolating waters from the quarry in order
to reach the rock. Since the locale was a coastal area, the diminu-
tion of the fresh water supply caused salt water to seep into the
plaintiff's well, rendering it unfit for use. The defendant did not
use the water but it conducted its operation according to the best
practices of open pit mining. The court held that the defendant's
motion for judgment of involuntary nonsuit was improperly over-
ruled. The defendant, according to the court, was using its land in
a legitimate and natural manner, and in this factual situation the
defendant was not chargeable with waste for not using the water it
removed.
These two cases make it clear that the reasonable use rule for
underground percolating or "ground" water is not the same as the
reasonable use rule applied to watercourses. A landowner whose
property overlies a productive water-bearing formation can consume
as much of the water as he needs for beneficial purposes on his own
land without regard to the effect that it will have on the ground
water supplies of his neighbors. The only limitations appear to be
that he must not waste the water (except in open pit mining)' 22
and that it cannot be diverted for sale or use on other land. 23 A
riparian owner may use the water in a watercourse to which he is
riparian only with due regard to the similar rights of other riparian
owners. The difference in the law of reasonable use in these two
classifications of water will come into vivid focus when and if a
user, thwarted in drawing directly from a surface stream all the
water he desires, constructs a well located so as to capture ground
water that would otherwise feed into the stream, or even reverse
the flow to obtain water from the stream such as to substantially
reduce its flow or to dry it up.
124
2. Obstruction.
According to the English or common law rule, the obstruction
of percolating water by the owner of land, incident to the use of
the land, was permissible in the absence of negligence or malice, even
122 DEWIEST 143; "Water that is pumped to dewater a mine is not 'sed
in the strict sense of the word. However, it if is discharged into a tidal
estuary it is wasted, or for all practical purposes 'consumed.'"
12
*3 Id. at 124.
... WISE MANAGEMENT-FINAL REPORT 19.
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though the adjoining owner was damaged thereby.1 21 In 1960120
the court had before it a case in which the defendant, in construct-
ing a building on its lot, erected a foundation wall adjacent to plain-
tiff's land. This wall obstructed the drainage of underground water,
causing it to back up on plaintiff's lot and into his cellar. The court
held that the complaint stated a cause of action for obstruction of
percolating water and that the evidence was sufficient for an issue
to be submitted to the jury on negligent obstruction of percolating
waters. However, in the course of the opinion the court stated that
the reasonable use rule applies to the obstruction of underground
water as well as to its diversion.
3. Pollution.
Pollution of individual wells and local pollution of aquifers from
septic tanks and other waste disposal, gasoline storage, insecticide
storage, and similar sources may occur. The court adheres to the
rule that a person who, by permitting the pollution of his own soil
or the water thereunder, contaminates his neighbor's well or water
supply is liable for damages. In one case 2r the plaintiff was awarded
damages because his well was contaminated by gasoline due to a
leak in a gasoline storage tank installed on land adjacent to the plain-
tiff's land and within one hundred and thirty feet of his well.
PART II-PUBLIC INTEREST IN WATER USE
Part I has dealt with private rights in water use including the
rules fashioned by the courts, with selected examples to demonstrate
how these rules are applied in different factual situations. The ju-
dicial approach, in keeping with the common law tradition, has been
flexible, especially in recognition of new demands on water use
growing out of industrial growth and development. Even so, there
are many unanswered questions in the law of private rights, particu-
larly in the law governing the rights of riparian owners. Of greater
importance, however, is the fact that the common law does not ade-
..
5 Annot., 29 A.L.R.2d 1354 (1953).
1
' Jones v. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 252 N.C. 626, 114 S.E.2d 638
(1963). The court also held that the complaint stated a cause of action for
obstruction of a subterranean stream, but since the plaintiffs did not have any
proof that the subterranean waters were other than percolating waters, a
nonsuit on this cause of action was affirmed.
1
. Masten v. The Texas Co., 194 N.C. 540, 140 S.E. 89 (1927). See also
Clark v. Lawrence, 59 N.C. 83 (1860).
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quately protect the larger public interest in water resources. This
is primarily a task for the General Assembly.
Legislation prior to 1967
In 1893 the General Assembly enacted laws which invoked the
police power of the state for the purpose of protecting the public
water supply from pollution. These laws,12 s including subsequent
amendments, vest certain powers, duties, and responsibilities in the
State Board of Health. Until 1951, there was no other significant
legislation on stream pollution. 29
In 1951, after unsuccessful efforts in 1947 and 1949, advocates
of stronger controls on stream pollution made substantial progress.
In that year the General Assembly created a State Stream Sanitation
Committee within the State Board of Health, and gave it extensive
powers to deal with the pollution problem. 3 ° The Committee was
charged both with the promulgation of detailed rules and regula-
tions and with the enforcement of such rules. In both its legislative
and administrative roles the Committee was subjected to procedural
safeguards. In 1959 the Committee was transferred, for adminis-
trative purposes, to the new Department of Water Resources with-
out change in its powers, duties, responsibilities, or functions.'
3
'
The Department of Water Resources, governed by the Board
of Water Resources, was created in 1959 and was charged with initi-
ating, planning and executing long-range water resource develop-
ment programs, including protection activities. 132 The authority of
the Department to control the quantity of water use was confined to
three limited areas:
(1) Local Public Water Emergencies. 133
Authority of the Board in this area, in summary follows:
Upon request by city or county authorities and after an in-
2. Now N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 130-157 to -166 (1964). Amended in 1899,
1903, rewritten in 1911 and further amended in 1957 and 1959. The 1903
version was held to be constitutional. Durham v. Cotton Mills, 141 N.C. 615,
54 S.E. 453 (1906).
P. GREEN, D. HAYMAN, & E. MACHEN, STREAM POLLUTION IN NORTH
CAROLINA 5 (1951).
"' An excellent analysis of this statute appears in 29 N.C.L. REv. 365-69
(1951).
1"1 For a brief history see; Long, Walter Pollution Control in North
Carolin , 28 POPULAR GOV'T 11 (March-April 1962).
12 For a more detailed outline of its responsibilities see 1 WisE MANAGE-
MENT 19-20.1
. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-354(b) -(e) (1964).
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vestigation by the Board, the Governor may declare a water
emergency in a locality where the needs of human consump-
tion, sanitation and public safety demand such a declara-
tion, When an emergency has been declared the Board may
authorize diversions for these limited purposes of human
consumption, sanitation and public safety and may regulate
the use of such diverted water in the emergency area. A
mechanism is provided for compensating those damaged by
diversions.13 4
(2) Legislation authorizing watershed improvement districts. The
Board has certain supervisory powers in this area includ-
ing the duty to examine and pass upon proposed work
plans in accordance with criteria set forth by the General
Assembly.135
(3) An Irrigation Permit Law. This statute, passed in 1951,
was repealed in 1961130 due to "ambiguities and difficulties
of administration."'13 7
Thus except for the very limited situations outlined in (1) and (2),
the Board had no firm basis to regulate water usage.
Quality and Quantity Controls in 1966
On the quality side, the State Stream Sanitation Committee had
classified 3 8 the surface waters of the state with regard to the highest
acceptable usage as follows: (1) drinking; (2) bathing; (3) fishing;
(4) agriculture, industrial cooling and processing supply; (5) navi-
gation and disposal of sewage and other wastes. Tidal salt water
was classified as suitable for (1) shellfishing for market purposes;
(2) bathing; (3) fishing; and (4) navigation. Further, in 1963
the Committee completed pollution abatement plans for surface
water. As to enforcement:
. . .no legal actions have yet been initiated by the Committee,
though some polluters have been called before the Committee to
explain unsatisfactory pollution abatement progress and one show
cause hearing has been held which, after the receiving of testi-
mony, the Committee recessed to permit the polluter to come for-
ward with satisfactory plans and cost estimates for pollution
abatement. Thus, the hallmark of North Carolina's Stream Sani-
1.. 1 WISE MANAGEMENT 97-98. This emergency power has not been
exercised, WISE MANAGEMENT-FINAL REPORT 17.
... N.C. GEN. STAT. § 139-35(c) (1964).
... Repealed by ch. 315 (1961) N.C. Sess. L.
1.7 1 WISE MANAGEMENT 96. Discussed in Heath & Wicker, Water Re-
sources, 28 POPULAR GOV'T 21 (Sept.-Oct. 1961).
13. DEWIEST 139.
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tation Program continues to be encouragement of voluntary abate-
ment action. Under this approach commendable progress has
been made in abatement of pollution. 39
In 1966 the Department of Water Resources made the following
observation about quality control of surface streams:
[C]enters of growing population and industry located near head-
waters of streams are beginning to exert pressures on regional
water resources which cannot be met solely by the water quality
regulations now practiced in North Carolina. Danger signals are
already visible in some locations. Their message is that even a
very high degree of treatment of sewage and industrial waste may
not long provide a reasonable margin for further economic growth
in these areas. 140
In respect to ground water, investigations and data collection
were in progress with a view toward completing a detailed plan for
groundwater development and management in the coastal plain region
by 1975 and for the mountain and piedmont regions prior to 1980.141
Under the law as it existed in 1966 authority was provided for
protection of ground-water reservoirs as they might be affected by
the disposal of wastes. But apparently the law did not provide for
protection of ground water from contamination such as salt-water
intrusion brought about by over-pumping. 42 In 1966 the Depart-
ment of Water Resources did not think that the State Stream Sani-
tation laws provided all the powers needed to assure water quality
suitable to meet all reasonable uses. 43
In 1966, quantity controls of both ground and surface water
were prime targets of consideration by the Department of Water
Resources. 44 Except for the two limited areas, previously men-
tioned, there was no legislation authorizing such controls. There
was no authority for anyone-public or private-to deal with the
over use of ground water. A Board of Consultants,' 45 employed by
the state, addressing itself to a particular problem in Beaufort
County on ground water, concluded that continued pumping of
... NORTH CAROLINA DEP'T OF WATER RESOURCES, NORTH CAROLINA
WATER RESOURCES PLANNING 69 (1964); Greensboro Daily News, Sept. 16,
1967, § B, at 1, col. 8.
1 WISE MANAGEMENT 104.
1" 2 WISE MANAGEMENT app. G at G23.
... DEWIEST 133-34.
I43 1 WIsE MANAGEMENT 38.
1
,, Id. at 104.
DEWIEST 159.
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sixty-five million gallons per day would surely result in "decreasing
the supply available for other present and future users and impair
the quality under a sizeable area." Undoubtedly, the possibility 4 '
of over use and misuse of ground water, especially in the coastal
plain region, with attendant lowering of water levels and salt con-
tamination, gave strong impetus to the enactment of significant
water use legislation by the 1967 General Assembly.
1967 Legislation
The 1967 General Assembly enacted nine laws and passed one
resolution dealing with water resources. 47 This legislation, cover-
ing almost one hundred printed pages, repeats certain existing legis-
lation, rewrites some, amends some, and adds much that is new.
A Department of Water and Air Resources is created to replace
the Department of Water Resources and the State Stream Sanitation
Committee. 4s A new Board of Water and Air Resources, con-
... Texas Gulf Sulphur was pumping sixty-five million gallons a day and
other mining companies were interested in the feasibility of recovering phos-
phates in Beaufort and Pamlico counties. Id. at 6.
"" (1) The North Carolina Water and Air Resource Act, ch. 892 [1967]
N.C. Sess. L., to appear in N.C. GEN STAT. § 143 art. 21; (2) Water Use
Act of 1967, ch. 933 (1967) N.C. Sess. L., to appear in N.C. GENr. STAT.
§ 143 art. 21; (3) The North Carolina Well Construction Act, ch. 1157
[1967] N.C. Sess. L., to appear in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 87; (4) An Act to
Amend the Well Driller Registration Act as set forth in N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 143 art. 38, ch. 1069 [1967] N.C. Sess. L.; (5) The Dam Safety Law of
1967, ch. 1068 [1967] N.C. Sess. L., to appear in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143
art. 21; (6) An Act to Amend the Small Watershed Laws with Regard to
Borrowing by Counties for Watershed Improvement Programs; Borrowing
by Counties and Municipalities for Water Supply Aspects of Such Programs;
Eminent Domain Powers; Extraterritorial Powers; Land Acquisition Au-
thority; Recreational Expenditures, and Fish and Wildlife Habitat, ch. 987
[1967] N.C. Sess. L. to appear in N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 139 & 153; (7) An
Act to Authorize the North Carolina Department of Water and Air Re-
sources to Assist, Coordinate, and Otherwise Participate with Local Levels
of Government in a Program of Flood Plain Management, ch. 1070 [1967]
N.C. Sess. L., to appear in N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 139 & 143; (8) An Act to
Provide a Means to Regulate Dredging and Filling of Marshes and Tidelands,
ch. 907 [1967] N.C. Sess. L., to appear in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 146; (9) An
Act to Amend the N.C. GEN. STAT. Relating to the Powers and Duties of
the Board of Water and Air Resources to authorize the Board "to provide
to Federal agencies the required assurances, subject to availability of appro-
priations by the General Assembly or applicable funds or assurances from
local governments, or non-Federal cooperation for water supply storage and
other Congressionally-authorized purposes in Federal Projects." ch. 1071
[1967] N.C. Sess. L., to appear in N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-354, -355; (10)
A Joint Resolution Directing the Legislative Research Commission to Study
Certain Water Resource Laws, and to Report Its Findings and Recommen-
dations to the 1969 General Assembly, Res. 38 [1967] N.C. Sess. L.
." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-212 (1967).
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sisting of thirteen members, is charged with the responsibility of
administering the laws relating to water use and water resource
management.1
49
The Board, with the approval of the Governor, is required to
appoint a full-time Director, who shall be a well qualified engineer,
experienced and knowledgeable in the fields of water and air resource
management.
The most significant feature of the 1967 legislation vests author-
ity in the Board to invoke quantity controls on water use in specified
situations. The Water Use Act of 1967 and the North Carolina
Well Construction Act are directed particularly to the quantitative
use of water.
Before summarizing the Water Use Act of 1967 and the Well
Construction Act, mention must be made of the fact that the new
Board, like its predecessor, is charged with certain responsibilities
in connection with local public water emergencies'5 ° and legislation
dealing with small watersheds.'51
Quantity Controls
The Water Use Act of 196752 means that henceforth a raindrop
might be subject to quantity controls established by the Board of
Water and Air Resources. To become a "public interest" raindrop
is by no means automatic. There are many hurdles to cross before
this can be accomplished, and under present legislation most rain-
drops in the state will continue as the "common law" variety.
Whether a raindrop becomes a "public interest" one or remains
under the "common law" will not depend on whether it is on the
surface or underground. The Water Use Act applies to water in
"any stream, river, brook, swamp, lake, sound, tidal estuary, bay,
creek, reservoir, waterway, or any other body or accumulation of
water, surface or underground, public or private, natural or arti-
fical," which is contained within, flows through, or borders upon
the state or any portion thereof, including those portions of the
Atlantic Ocean over which the state has jurisdiction.
The first step required to establish that a raindrop is in the pub-
149N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-214 (1967).
1 oN.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-354(b)-(c) (1964).
...N.C. GEN. STAT. § 139-35(c) (1964).
Ch. 933 [1967] N.C. Sess. L. The Act will be included in N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 143 art. 21. Section numbers will be assigned by the Attorney-
General.
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lic interest is the Board determination that it is in a "capacity use
area." The Board is authorized to declare a "capacity use area"
provided it follows specific and detailed procedures outlined in the
Act. If the Board believes that a capacity use situation exists or
is emerging, it will direct the Department to investigate."5 3 The
Department will file a written report with recommendations to the
Board. If the Board then contemplates issuing an order declaring
a capacity use area, it must give notice and hold one or more hear-
ings before issuing a final order.
After a "capacity use area" has been designated, the Board may
proceed to formulate regulations concerning water use, such as
timing of withdrawals, protection against or abatement of salt en-
croachment, and it may prescribe pumping levels or maximum pump-
ing rates or both. Again there must be notice and one or more
hearings on the regulations before the Board takes final action.
Water users in a "capacity use area" are required by law to
secure a permit from the Board in all instances where use is in
excess of 100,000 gallons per day. If the use is consumptive, the
Board may grant or deny a permit for use in excess of 100,000
gallons a day. If the use is non-consumptive (as defined in the
.. The Water Use Act of 1967, ch. 933 [1967] N.C. Sess. L. defines "a
capacity use area" as follows:
Within the meaning of this Act 'a capacity use area' is one where the
Board finds that the aggregate uses of ground water or surface water,
or both, or in affecting said area (1) have developed or threatened to
develop to a degree which requires coordination and regulation, or (2)
exceed or threaten to exceed, or otherwise threaten or impair, the re-
newal or replenishment of such waters or any part of them.
The following areas have been identified by the Board of Water Resources
as possible "capacity use areas" but the Board made it clear that there was
no implication that each of them would be so declared:
1. Pigeon River watershed (surface waters).
2. French Broad River watershed (surface waters).
3. Tuckasegee River watershed (surface waters).
4. South Fork, Catawba River watershed (surface waters).
5. Catawba basin stream watersheds in Mecklenberg County (surface
waters ).
6. Rocky River watershed (tributary to the Pee Dee) (surface
waters).
7. Haw River watershed (surface waters).
8. Northeast Cape Fear River watershed (surface waters).
9. Beaufort County area (ground water).
10. Area near Franklin, Virginia, in Gates and Hertford Counties
(ground water).
11. New Bern-Kinston area (ground water).
12. New Hanover County area (ground water).
WISE MANAGEMENT-FINAL REPORT 35.
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Act),1" the Board is required to issue a permit without a hearing
and without attaching conditions which it might include in a con-
sumptive use permit.
Water users in a "capacity use area" who do not use in excess
of 100,000 gallons a day are not required to secure a permit, but,
nevertheless, are required to comply with regulations issued by the
Board concerning water use for the area except for such quantities
as are considered domestic water use.
As previously indicated, the Board is required to hold one or
more public hearings before final action can be taken on each of the
following: (1) declaration of a "capacity use area"; (2) issuance of
regulations; and (3) passing on a permit application when the use
is consumptive. These hearings must be before the Board, or before
one or more of its members, or before one or more of its qualified
employees. A complete record is required and the procedures "in-
sofar as practicable" shall follow those applicable in civil actions in
the superior court.155
Any person "against whom any final order or decision has been
made"' 56 shall have a right of appeal to the Superior Court of Wake
County or of the county where the order or decision is effective.
"' "Non-consumptive use" means (a) the use of water withdrawn from
a stream in such a manner that it is returned to the stream without
substantial diminution in quantity at or near the point from which it
was taken; or of (sic) the user owns both sides of the stream at the
point of withdrawal, the water is returned to the stream upstream of
the next property below the point of diversion on either side of the
stream; (b) the use of water withdrawn from a ground water system
or aquifer in such a manner that it is returned to the ground water
system or aquifer from which it was withdrawn without substantial
diminution in quantity or substantial impairment in quality at or near
the point from which it was withdrawn; (c) Provided, however, that
(in determining whether a use of ground water is nonconsumptive) the
Board may take into consideration whether any material injury or
detriment to other water users of the area by reason of reduction of
water pressure in aquifer or system has not been adequately compen-
sated by the permit applicant who caused or substantially contributed
to such injury or detriment. ch. 933, § 11(7) [1967] N.C. Sess. L.
.. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-214 (1967) prescribes that Board members
(particularly those appointed to succeed those initially appointed) have cer-
tain qualifications but training in law is omitted. However, Res. 83 [1967]
N.C. Sess. L. directs the Legislative Research Commission to study, report
and recommend to the 1969 General Assembly "the need for legislation pro-
viding for a special master or hearing officer procedure for proceedings
preliminary to orders and determinations of the State Board of Water and
Air Resources."
... No appeal is permitted on action taken by the Board pursuant to N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 143-215(j) (1967). This section deals with air pollution.
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"The matter on appeal shall be heard and determined de novo on
the transcript certified to the court and any evidence or additional
evidence as shall be competent under rules of evidence than appli-
cable to trials in the Superior Court without a jury upon any ques-
tion of fact . . ." The decision of the judge may be appealed to
the North Carolina Supreme Court.
In the event the Water Use Act of 1967 is attacked on con-
stitutional grounds, the issue will be whether the legislation repre-
sents a valid exercise of the police power or whether it is a taking
of private property without compensation, in violation of the Federal
and State Constitutions. Then, too, there is a question as to whether
those provisions in the Act requiring the Board to consider prior
use and prior investments in the issuance of permits are grants of
exclusive or separate emolument or privilege within the meaning
of article 1, section 7 of the North Carolina Constitution.""
Any person who violates any provision of the Act is guilty of
a misdemeanor and shall be liable for penalties specified in the Act.
In addition, upon violation of any of the provisions of the Act, or
the regulations of the Board pursuant to the Act, the Director of
..7 The court discussed the "police power" of the state extensively in
upholding the constitutionality of the 1903 Act protecting public water sup-
plies from pollution. Durham v. Cotton Mills, 141 N.C. 615, 54 S.E. 453
(1906). A provision in the 1915 Legislation exempting corporations char-
tered prior to March 4, 1915 from the proscription against emptying into
streams deleterious or poisonous substances inimical to fish was held to be a
classification having no relation to the evil sought to be remedied. State v.
Glidden, 228 N.C. 664, 46 S.E.2d 860 (1948). The court said:
The broad nature of the exception made by the provision and its lack
of useful relation to any purpose which could be attributed to the mea-
sure, especially the purported purpose of conserving fish life, is appar-
ent, The exception embraces and immunizes all corporations char-
tered before the 4th day of March, 1915, without reference to whether
the members of the class thus privileged were at that time using the
streams to carry off waste products of a deleterious nature, or had any
investment which might be impaired by a statutory prohibition, or
whether the corporation is domestic or foreign, seated or ambulatory.
Corporations chartered prior to March 4, 1915, alone are permitted to
pollute the waters, where already engaged, or elsewhere, or if not, to
peruse the map and sit down at any time, at any place, and begin.
They thus have a privilege denied to corporations chartered on or after
that date and to "any person or persons" whatsoever, without quali-
fication.
The requirement that the Board consider prior use and prior investment may
pass muster on constitutional grounds not only as coming within the criteria
suggested in the foregoing statement by the court, but also on the ground
that the Board has only to consider these factors along with others in arriving
at its conclusions. See generally Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74
YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
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the Department may, either before or after the institution of pro-
ceedings for the collection of the penalty, institute a civil action in
the superior court for injunctive relief to restrain the violation.
The North Carolina Well Construction Act 5 ' is designed to
protect the public health and the ground-water resources of the
State. The Board is required to adopt, and may from time to time
amend, rules and regulation not inconsistent with this Act governing
the location, construction, repair and abandonment of wells, and
the installation and repair of pumps and pumping equipment. Prior
permission shall be obtained from the Board for the construction of
(1) any water well or well system with a designed capacity of
one hundred thousand gallons per day or greater; and
(2) any other well in a geographical area where the Board finds,
after public hearings, such permission to be reasonably nec-
essary to protect the ground-water resources and the public
welfare, safety and health, taking into consideration other
applicable State laws.
An application cannot be rejected under (2) unless the Board finds
that its construction would violate the Act or a rule or regulation
which had been adopted by the Board. Wells and pump installations
in existence and in use on the effective date of this Act are exempt
from the permit requirement. However, abandoned wells, within
such time as specified by the Board, may be made subject to the
provisions of the Act and to such regulations as the Board may adopt
with respect to abandoned wells.
Provisions for hearings, appeals, penalties, and injunctive relief,
in general, parallel those appearing in the Water Use Act of 1967.
Quality Controls
The North Carolina Water and Air Resources Act 159 substan-
tially reEnacts existing legislation' 60 on water pollution and provides
new legislation on air pollution. The authority formerly vested in
the Stream Sanitation Committee on water pollution was transferred
to the new Department of Water and Air Resources. Some changes
were made in the law. For example, the Board, unlike the State
..8 Ch. 1157 [1967] N.C. Sess. L. to be included in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143
art. 21.
' ' N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-211 to -215 (1964).100N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215(d) (4) (1964). This provision was de-
leted in the 1967 legislation.
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Stream Sanitation Committee, is not legislatively required to con-
sider in classifying streams:
The extent to which such water is already receiving sewage, in-
dustrial waste, or other waste as a result of present or past usage
of the water, and the relative economic values involved in im-
proving or attempting to improve the condition of such water. 101
The new Act, like its predecessor, calls for administrative self re-
straint. The powers of the Act are to be exercised only when the
objectives of the Act cannot be achieved by voluntary action within
a reasonable time. On the other hand, the most significant differ-
ence in the new Act and its predecessor is stronger enforcement
powers, thus indicating that voluntary action has not proved to be
sufficient in itself and that in some situations in the future it will
be essential for the Board to invoke its enforcement powers.
Officials of municipalities or other political subdivisions are no
longer insulated from the penalties provided in the Act. They are
now exempt only where a vote of the people is required to effectuate
the purpose of the Act and the vote on the referendum is against
the means or machinery for carrying the same into effect. This
provision appears to be designed to require officials to exercise such
discretion as they may have to prevent or end pollution.
A new provision gives the Board power to declare an emergency
situation and authority to order a polluter to cease or reduce his
pollution.
Penalties for violation have been increased, power to seek an
injunction has been vested specifically in the Director and Assistant
Director of the Board, investigatory powers have been strengthened,
and jury trials on appeals from the Board have been eliminated. In
general, the enforcement provisions in the Water and Air Resources
Act are the same as those in the Water Use Act.
The Water and Air Resources Act does not diminish or disturb
the existing authority1 2 vested in the State Board of Health to deal
with water pollution. The State Board of Health, in general, has
responsibilities for the disposal of sewage and wastes from public
schools and state and local institutions, raw milk dairies, farm
slaughter houses, shellfish processing plants, and similar establish-
ments. The Board of Water and Air Resources, like its predecessor,
... N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 130-157 to -166 (1964).1 2N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 130-157 to -166 (1964).
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cannot approve and issue a permit for the discharge of wastes into
waters either used or classified for use as public water supply until
the State Board of Health determines and advises that the proposed
method of treatment is approved by that agency.
Conclusion
Cooperation between the federal. 3 and state governments in the
planning, development, and control of water resources is essential.
In 1957 the relative roles of the states and the federal government
in the development and control of water resources was summarized:
The federal government now dominates in the fields of navigation,
flood control, hydroelectric power development, irrigation, and
river basin planning. The states dominate in the fields of water
rights, urban water supplies, drainage, and fish and wildlife man-
agement. The responsibilities are more shared in the fields of
power regulation, recreational planning, pollution control, and
small watershed development. 64
The General Assembly in 1967 declared "that the water and air
resources of the State belong to the people."'6 5  Substantial legisla-
tion, including the Water Use Act,'66 the Well Construction Act, 6 '
and the Water and Air Resources Act, 6" means that the General
Assembly intends North Carolina to be an active partner with the
federal government in the preservation of its water and air re-
sources.
169
It is difficult to establish a proper balance between private water
." The federal government has ample constitutional authority in the com-
merce clause, the federal proprietary interest, the general welfare and taxing
power, the war power and indian and international treaties. King, Federal-
State Relations in the Control of Water Resources, 37 U. OF DET. L.J. 1
(1959); Heath, Some Legal Aspects of Federal and State Regulation of
Water Pollution, 30 POPULAR GOV'T 9 (June 1964).
... Englebert, Federalism and Water Resource Development, 22 LAw &
CONTEMP. PaoB. 323, 330 (1956).
... The North Carolina Water and Air Resources Act, ch. 892 [1967]
N.C. Sess. L., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-211 (1967).Ch. 933 [1967] N.C. Sess. L.
187 Ch. 1157 [1967] N.C. Sess. L.
168 Ch. 892 [1967] N.C. Sess. L.
188 For a brief discussion of several federal laws see 2 WISE MANAGE-
MENT app. G at G3-G18. Ch. 1071 [1967] N.C. Sess. L. amends N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 143-354(a) (1964) to authorize the Board of Water and Air Re-
sources "to provide to Federal agencies the required assurances, subject to
availability of appropriations by the General Assembly of applicable funds
or assurances from local governments, of non-Federal cooperation for water
supply storage and other Congressionally-authorized purposes in Federal
projects."
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rights and a conflicting public interest in water resources. The 1967
legislation represents a significant effort to protect the public interest
through the exercise of the police power of the state. The frame-
work for an effective program has been achieved; however, due to
the complicated and detailed procedure contained in the legislation,
considerable leakage is likely to occur in this new system of water
use controls. The 1967 General Assembly, no doubt, foresaw this
possibility for it directed the Legislative Research Commission to
study, report, and make recommendations to the 1969 General
Assembly:
on the water resources legislation proposed and enacted by the
1967 General Assembly, the experience in applying such legisla-
tion, and the need for further legislation in the light of such ex-
perience. 170
1
. Res. 83 [1967] N.C. Sess. L.
